It's somewhat common for people to justify their behaviour by appealing to the behaviour of other animals, or by claiming it’s ‘natural’ (an ambiguous term). This is a strange justification, given that many valuable aspects of our lives like the purification of water or the use of modern medicine are profoundly unnatural and unlike anything observed in animals.

Fundamentally, this objection fails to appreciate the fact that animals engage in behaviours that we would deem both acceptable (e.g. cooperation and sharing) and unacceptable (e.g. infanticide and rape) in the human context. Likewise, there are behaviours that are natural that we would consider acceptable (e.g. altruism, cooperation, compassion) and unacceptable (e.g. infanticide and rape) in the human context. So, it’s hard to see how the naturalness of a behaviour or the fact that animals engage in it would determine whether it is morally right or wrong.

What is more, because we already differentiate between the natural and animal behaviours that are acceptable or not for humans to engage in we must already have a separate standard by which we’re judging them. So we already implicitly recognise that a behaviour being natural or observed in animals is not sufficient to deem it to be moral.

#2 – If we don’t procreate humans will go extinct!

Whether it’s moral to create someone is a different question to the one of extinction. Extinction is a question not just about creating new people but also whether those who exist should continue to (i.e. the ending of lives). Nevertheless, extinction as a topic will come up in discussions about antinatalism and so it’s worth addressing.

Humans could go extinct in a horrible way and a final generation will surely face hardships that none other has. This is a different question though to the one of whether being extinct is bad for humans. It seems odd to say that it would be. After all, there wouldn’t be anyone for whom it would be bad. No one to lament the non-existence of our species.

It’s also worth considering that our species’ demise is inevitable. Whether it happens by our own hand or not, it is a matter of time. There are advantages to us facilitating our own extinction, and it being controlled and sooner that it otherwise would have been. Besides avoiding the suffering that would be imposed on future generations (and the suffering they would themselves impose), intentionally facilitating our species’ extinction means we can approach it with care and consideration – gradually reducing procreation and (hopefully) lightening the burden on the final generation.

#3 – Everyone else is going to continue procreating. Me not procreating won’t make a difference!

Of course, one person not reproducing isn’t going to make much difference to the total number of new people being brought into existence. But the morality of creating someone shouldn’t be determined by how widespread the practice is. Whether others reproduce or not, the act of creating a child should be morally evaluated on its own merits.

We wouldn’t accept this reasoning in other situations. Imagine you were to live in a society where the genital mutilation of infants were commonly practiced. The mere fact that it was a widespread practice wouldn’t make it morally permissible. Similarly, if slavery were a widespread practice it wouldn’t be morally permissible to hold slaves just because it was common to do so. Why should this reasoning be accepted in the case of procreation?

There’s also reason to think that one person not reproducing would make some difference – even beyond avoiding the harm to the potential child. Each person who chooses not to reproduce will help normalise non-reproduction and contribute to weakening the social norms that may pressure others into reproducing.

#4 – We have reproductive systems for a reason! We’re supposed to procreate.

The fact that we have the ability to do something tells us nothing about whether we should do it. We have the biological capacity to have sex. There is nothing about our capacity to have sex that tells us that it should be consensual; and yet, we go beyond recognising our biological capacity and consider sex through a moral lens to understand that consent is required.

Now, it may be said that “reproduction is our biological purpose – it’s the only reason we exist.” While it’s true that we exist in evolutionary terms to further the replication of our genes, this has no bearing on the morality of procreation. Evolution isn’t an agent with preferences to consider; it’s a process, like erosion or evaporation.

Even the most adamant pronatalists would recognise that there are at least some instances where procreation isn’t morally acceptable. The existence of these cases alone shows that the mere capacity to reproduce isn’t a justification for doing so.

#5 – My religion says I can procreate.

Many people believe that they should be allowed to impose their religious convictions onto others; or that they should be able to manipulate the behaviour of others in accordance with their religious sensitivities. This line of reasoning is a two-way street though. If they believe their religious conviction permits them imposing certain restrictions on others, then the religious convictions of others would allow their imposing the same on them. Take this example: while a religious person might welcome the introduction of religiously motivated homophobic laws, they likely wouldn’t support equally religiously motivated laws that sentence homophobes (like themselves) to imprisonment.

Creating someone imposes significant harm on them. If someone justifies this through their religious convictions, they must accept that others could impose similarly serious harms on them for the same reason. You cannot expect to set a standard for behaviour and then be exempt from the implications; in other words, the religious can’t have their cake and eat it too.

And one final thing to note is that there are specifically religious reasons to embrace antinatalism. One example being that if someone believes in the concept of hell, then they’re not simply creating someone to experience a mortal life but potentially an eternity in hell. That’s an intolerable risk to take on someone else’s behalf.

#6 – Who would take care of the final generation?

As existing people, we rely on institutions – such as social care systems and global supply chains – that depend on the creation of new people. We are privileged in this regard. The final generation, presumably, won’t benefit from such institutions (unless we can decouple them from their reliance on ‘human capital’). As a result, the final generation may face significant challenges that we do not. This is an injustice – but so is creating another generation to avoid that situation.

Creating someone as a means of alleviating your own problems – even if you’re in the final generation – doesn’t seem ethical, and many people recognise this in other circumstances. Let’s say you were to be in £100,000 of debt, it would not be ethical to create a child simply so to pass that debt onto them; even if it had come to you through no fault of your own. The issues that we face as existing people are our own to bear and we shouldn’t see possible future people as “get out of jail free” cards.

What’s more, there will be a final generation whether we like it or not, and there likely isn’t a perfect solution to the challenges they will face. But surely it’s better for us to prepare for the coming of that final generation and put systems in place to help them live as good a life as possible. And for them to recognise the predicament they’re in and try to make the best of it, given the circumstances – not to create new people and impose significant harms on them.

A well-planned, voluntary extinction seems a more ethical and sensible response to the inevitable end of our species than being wiped out by an unplanned existential threat.

#7 – There’s so much suffering in the world, me having a child is just a drop in the ocean!

ICreating someone is no small thing. It imposes significant harm on them – as each of our lives contain serious suffering, injustice, death and more. It also puts them at risk of extraordinary suffering like those suffering from cluster headaches or some debilitating genetic disorder. When looking at a ‘drop in an ocean’, it’s the size and merits of the drop that should be in focus, not the ocean.

Whilst there’s a lot of suffering in the world, this doesn’t give us as individuals permission to just act as we like. And it doesn’t change anything (if anything it makes it worse) for the person who we’d create. The pervasiveness of suffering shouldn’t be seen as a way to absolve one’s self of moral responsibility. Each of us has at least some control over our actions and for that we are responsible.

What’s more is that if we were to give this reasoning a pass, then any immoral action could be seen as “a drop in the ocean”. Imagine if someone used the “it’s a drop in the ocean” line after burning their neighbour’s house down because their dog soiled their lawn. We’d rightly recognise this is not a good justification.

#8 – My child could do great things in their life like cure cancer.

Weirdly, this objection proposes to create a person in order to alleviate an issue that itself results from the creation of people. And sadly, the child that would be created is much more likely to get cancer than to have any hope of curing it. It’s as Peter Wessel Zapffe said, “To bear children into this world is like carrying wood to a burning house.”

A more appropriate way of helping the effort to cure something like cancer would be to put invest the resources one would have spent on raising a child directly into finding a cure for cancer. Or to use the same resources to fund the education of many already existing children who otherwise would not have received one, so that they can (hopefully) go on to contribute toward a cure.

We also need to soberly consider the range of possible impacts our child may have. It’s true that whilst there is a chance they could develop a cure for cancer, the chances are much higher they will go on to cause a large amount of suffering (particularly to non-human animals). Even if someone can provide the conditions for raising a well-rounded child, they can adopt a child. There are millions of existing children that (currently) won’t fulfil their potential. If given the opportunity, they could have a large, positive impact on the world.

#9 – I need children to support me in old age. Otherwise, I’ll become lonely and lack help.

This worry should be met with sympathy. None of us consented to coming into existence and, as such, the physical and (often) social burden of old age is not something we opted-in to voluntarily. But that doesn’t justify creating someone to alleviate our own predicament.

Creating someone in the hope that they might ease a burden is something even most natalists would reject. If we were to follow this line of reasoning, we’d have to accept people creating children to ease the burden of financial debt – passing (at least some of) it on to them. But if we reflect honestly on this, most people would acknowledge that it would be, at best, a morally dubious thing to do.

There are other, more appropriate ways to (hopefully) alleviate the problem of care in old age: 1) find services that provide community and care for the elderly, 2) build a community with others facing the same predicament, and 3) adopt someone out of concern for their vulnerability and needs and in return they may choose to do the same in return. And the resources that would have been spent creating a child could go toward financing this.

#10 – Having children is all I want in life, without children my life is meaningless.

This objection comes from an understandable place. Many people have a strong desire to procreate and base many of their plans around starting a family – but that doesn’t make it morally justified.

Whether we draw a sense of meaning or fulfilment from something shouldn’t be the thing that tells us whether it’s morally okay to do. Some people may find meaning in conquest or running a drug cartel, but we wouldn’t take that to justify those actions. And this is even more true when there are alternatives, like adopting over creating biological offspring. (Of course, when adopting someone, their interests should be the primary concern, but it’s reasonable to acknowledge that the adopter may also gain a sense of meaning from raising them.)

It’s also worth noting that while it’s entirely understandable to derive meaning from relationships with others, it seems unhealthy for such a profound sense of purpose to be tied to a relationship with a being who doesn’t even exist (yet). It may be healthier for all of us to cultivate the capacity to find meaning and fulfilment in pursuits that are independent of any specific individual – like pushing for social change or pursuing a passion project – and to develop a sense of contentment within ourselves.

#11 – I can give my child a good life, they won’t suffer that much.

No life is worth starting. Even the best lives are characterised by a striving to meet needs and desires that needn’t have been created in the first place. Needs and desires that we are often ill-equipped to adequately satiate. This leaves us in a state of frustration for extended periods of our life. What’s more is that there are some ills that no amount of affluence can completely protect one from: chronic disease, depression, accidents and oppression, to name a few. And whilst the risk of extraordinary suffering to someone in affluence is relatively low, it exists and isn’t necessary to impose on someone.

More fundamentally though, the things that we value positively in our lives are only of value to us because we already exist. Someone who does not exist has no interest in coming into existence to experience or obtain any of these things. In creating someone, we create the need and desire for the very thing we said we were creating them to benefit from in the first place. That seems utterly nonsensical.

Finally, we should take care not to overestimate the level of control we have over our offspring’s quality of life. The world they’re being brought in to is awash with horrors that are often largely outside of our control: violence, terrorism, rape, disaster, accident, oppression, illness and more.

#12 – Eventually, we’ll innovate suffering out of existence. Then there won’t be a problem!

In reality, we have no idea if humans will ever abolish suffering. But let’s humour this suggestion and assume that (at some point) we do. This wouldn’t provide a reason to create future generations.

Firstly, the reason there would be the suffering of future generations to abolish would be because we have created them. As David Benatar said: “It is curious that while good people go to great lengths to spare their children from suffering, few of them seem to notice that the one (and only) guaranteed way to prevent all the suffering of their children is not to bring those children into existence in the first place.” It makes little sense to put someone in harms way by creating them and then try to mitigate the harm that they will come to. Especially since they won’t be deprived of any pleasures since they won’t exist to be deprived.

Secondly, if we were to cease procreating, the energy that would have gone into abolishing the suffering of future generations could be spent helping already existing beings.

Finally, suffering wouldn’t be abolished overnight. There would be millions (or possibly billions) of people born in the intervening generations between now and when it finally is. These people would suffer serious harm; all to emancipate far-off future people from harms that could have been avoided by simply not creating them.

#13 – We’ve always procreated. It’s normal!

The fact that humans have always procreated doesn’t provide moral justification for continuing to procreate. Humans have killed and maimed each other for as long as our history goes back, but it’s obvious to anyone that this doesn’t provide any sort of moral reason for us to condone continuing to kill and maim each other.

As the objections says, procreation is also normalised. But, something being normalised – and even non-participation being stigmatised – doesn’t provide moral justification for it. Doing what is socially-accepted without critical moral evaluation seems more like conformity than anything resembling morality.

Take the example of human slavery. It has been practiced for a very long time (and still is today) and for much of our history has been considered normal. Nevertheless, it is condemned by decent people today. Any practice, no matter how long-established or normalised, should be subject to moral examination.

#14 – I’m only having one child – that’s better than three or four.

Whilst creating just one child isn’t as bad as creating three or four, each of us have the ability to not create any. And the morality of creating a child is not relative to some hypothetical number of children you could create. The morality of creating each child is based on the case of that child.

And this is the case for many issues. Take theft as an example: stealing just one item is not as bad as stealing four or five, but it is still bad and the morality of stealing that one item should be judged on its own merits. Not in relation to a hypothetical number of items that one could have stolen.

It should also be noted that creating one child is not just creating that child, but creating someone who could then go on to participate in the creation of many more people too. Each of them being made vulnerable to harm by their coming into existence.

#15 – It’s selfish not to have children and to deprive them of a chance at life.

Not creating someone isn’t depriving anyone of a life. They don’t exist. There’s no plausible reason to believe a person exists in any way before they are created. There aren’t ghost foetuses longing to come into existence. And if failing to create someone was truly depriving them of a life, then each of us would be doing something wrong by not having as many children as we can reasonably support.

It’s somewhat understandable that within the current pronatalist paradigm many people see the creation and raising of children as a selfless act. However, this perspective could benefit from some reframing. While biological parents do invest significant time and resources into their child’s care and development, this shouldn’t be viewed as selfless in the same way as charity work is, for example. People choose to procreate because they want to — to fulfil their own desires or the desires of others, not to benefit their future child. The resources they then use to raise their child aren’t gifts to their offspring, they’re owed to them under the obligations their parents freely took on when deciding to procreate.

What’s more is that the child will suffer as a result of their creation, and that is something the parents understood when creating them. But they still did so because they wanted to. It’s sad this fact isn’t more widely recognised as selfish but that’s probably because it’s just so normalised.

#16 – You’re just depressed, you need to look on the bright side of life.

It’s somewhat understandable for someone to perceive antinatalists as being overly pessimistic. It might be their first time engaging with someone who is drawing particular attention to the negative aspects of existence. It’s not unwarranted though that antinatalists highlight these negatives because most people are unduly optimistic about existence; and this optimism can often contribute to their creating new people.

This doesn’t mean that antinatalists should wallow in negativity. It’s possible to soberly recognise the bad in existence whilst also enjoy our day-to-day lives as much as one can. Of course, some antinatalists are depressed, but so are many people generally. The arguments for antinatalism should be considered independent of the mental state of the person holding them. To do otherwise would be to judge the messenger and not the message.

Telling antinatalists to “look on the bright side of life” implies that they haven’t, when they usually have. Depending on the type of antinatalism, the positives in life are either rejected as insufficient justification for imposing the harms, or they are simply not seen as a reason to create someone (but the harms are seen as a reason not to).

#17 – If life is so bad then why not just kill yourself?

This question can be asked in a dismissive and callous way, and if it is this should be condemned. But, it can also be asked as a genuine question by someone who isn’t familiar with antinatalism, and that’s somewhat understandable.

Antinatalists do often argue that even the best lives are very bad, and whilst this is the case it doesn’t mean that those who hold this view think that life is equally bad all of the time. The bad in life can often be concentrated into specific periods. In these periods it may be rational (in some cases) for someone to consider ending their life, but in the other (less bad) periods they may wish to continue their life.

There is a more fundamental confusion at play here though, and that is a confusion between the act of starting a life and the act of continuing one – these are fundamentally different things. If someone already exists, they can make a decision for themselves as to whether they wish to continue existing. Perhaps their interest in avoiding suffering is not being infringed upon severely enough to override their other interests (like in continuing to exist, maintaining relationships or furthering projects). The case of starting a life though, is different in important ways. First, it’s not a decision made by the person whose life will be started. As a result, any suffering in their life will necessarily be imposed without their consent. Second, prior to being created there is no being to have an interest in coming into existence – there is no interest to weigh up against the aforementioned suffering.

#18 – It’s my personal choice to procreate, don’t try to impose your beliefs on me!

Expressing an antinatalist view isn’t an imposition on the person hearing it. Each of us are free to share our view and others are free to respond with criticism, especially on issues as important as procreative ethics.

On the matter of procreation being a personal choice, in one sense it is and in another it isn’t. It’s a personal choice in the sense that you can personally make a decision as to whether to procreate, but in another sense it isn’t because it’s a decision that has direct and significant consequences for someone else (i.e. the person being created). Whilst the legal right to reproduce should be maintained, the moral implications of procreation should be scrutinised.

When it comes to a decision as serious as whether to create someone, it’s each of our responsibility to consider the moral arguments both for and against doing so. To hide behind a shield of “personal choice” would be to sell our potential children short, in that we haven’t given due consideration to the question of whether it’s right to create them.

#19 – Children should be grateful that they exist.

This objection might not come across as callous at first glance, but we should think about the children that are being told to be grateful. Of course, this objection would apply to the many children living relatively comfortable lives, but it could also apply to those who fall victim to horrific things like sex trafficking and terrorist attacks, or those who suffer depression and chronic pain. It might seem strange to assume that people forwarding this objection would include those less fortunate children – and many won’t – but some of the more religious advocates of this objection do. And that should be kept in mind.

Let’s bring it back though to a more reasonable form of this objection though that focuses more on those children with lives that are generally deemed to be comfortable. Most people seem to create children – and thus put them in harm’s way – because they want to, not for the sake of the child. What is there to be grateful for in creation itself? It can’t be gratitude for a good life because the only reason someone even desires or needs a good life is because they were created in the first place. A good life is only a benefit once someone exists. So gratitude is being asked of children who were brought into existence without their request, where they will be in harms’ way, and where the good things they’ll experience in life wouldn’t have been missed had they not been created. That seems very odd.

#20 – You should be spending your time helping people who already exist!

It’s completely understandable to want to focus on alleviating the suffering and hardship of those who already exist, and obviously this is something that we should be doing. But there are two things to say here: 1) prevention is better than cure, and 2) we can do two things at once.

There are endless situations where we recognise that avoiding a harm occurring in the first place is better than remedying it once it has occurred. And we should understand antinatalism in this light, in that it prevents the harms of existence from ever occurring. Plus, we can pay attention to more than one issue at the same time. Someone can help those suffering from infectious disease, whilst also promoting contraception, for example.

In fact, not reproducing could actually increase someone’s capacity for alleviating the issues that face existing people. It’ll mean they have more time and resources at their disposal and they won’t be creating another person who may themselves fall victim to the issue they’re trying to address.

#21 – You wouldn’t exist to have this conversation if you weren’t born!

It’s obvious that if someone was never born they wouldn’t be able to hold a conversation, but that is irrelevant to whether it’s morally permissible to create someone. To come to a judgement on whether you think it is you would need to consider the arguments for and against antinatalism.

What’s more, this objection seems to suggest that you can’t oppose procreation simply because you were created through your parents procreating. This makes no sense. We wouldn’t dismiss the views of someone advocating against rape on the basis that they were conceived through a rape. How someone comes to exist is not of their choosing and shouldn’t be held against them when they’re forming their ethical beliefs.

It’s an unfortunate reality that people are brought into existence. Once they’re here though they’re fully entitled to form a view on the morality of creating new people. Antinatalists argue that it’s morally wrong to bring new sentient beings into existence. If this view is to be challenged, the challenge should be on its merits – not dismissed because antinatalists had to be born in order to hold their position.

#22 – Pain is subjective. What is suffering to you may not be to someone else!

Pain is subjective in the sense that the same stimulus can lead to a variety of negative experiences across individuals. But this shouldn’t be taken as grounds for making overly strong claims about the subjectivity of pain itself. As humans, we all share a common nervous system capable of producing intense pain. While there is natural variation in our individual pain tolerances – which may be what the objection is pointing to – this doesn’t undermine the fact that we are all capable of feeling pain, and that the causes of pain are often predictable.

Importantly, the subjectivity that there is in how different people experience pain shouldn’t be used to justify imposing harm on others. We wouldn’t put much stock in someone who has committed a stabbing saying that “pain is subjective” as a way of minimising what they have done. Likewise, the imposition of pain and suffering on another person through creating them shouldn’t be excused by citing subjectivity.

Regardless of the differences in how individuals experience pain, the fact that we all do experience pain (and suffering) – almost always in significant amounts – is sufficient for antinatalist arguments to be taken seriously. The specific causes of that pain are less important.

#23 – Who are you to tell me what to do?

This objection comes from a place of defensiveness, but it shouldn’t be allowed to act as a shield against scrutiny. If someone is considering taking an action that would significantly impact others, they should offer good reasons for taking that action. And emotional reactivity is not a substitute for ethical justification.

Defensiveness also tends to derail a conversation. The following is a way that you may be able to bring the dialogue back to something more productive:

“Sorry if it seemed like I was trying to tell you what to do – that’s not my intention. I am sharing what I think people should do, but I’m also just trying to offer a perspective that you might not have fully considered before. I realise it feels like a foreign concept to many people, but when most people I’ve spoken to genuinely consider antinatalism they agree it has something valuable to bring to the conversation. What aspect of antinatalism is it that you have the most disagreement with?”

#24 – You’ll just be reincarnated. So, if you don’t procreate it won’t ultimately change anything.

It’s difficult to respond to this objection without a clear understanding of the specific worldview this person has. However, if we take reincarnation as a general view to be an accurate depiction of reality, it’s still possible to say something in response.

If someone believes that consciousness persists beyond physical death and re-inhabits new bodies, this belief doesn't necessarily undermine the antinatalist position. After all, for consciousness to reincarnate, there must be a new body to inhabit. In this sense, advocating for non-reproduction simply amounts to reducing the number of ‘vessels’ available for consciousness to enter.

Regardless of whether reincarnation is true, if there are fewer children created then there are fewer children to fall victim to abuse and all the other ills in this world.

#25 – This is a very dangerous idea! You should be careful talking about it.

It’s common for people to justify their behaviour through an appeal to the behaviour of other animals, or because the behaviour is natural (a somewhat ambiguous term). This is a curious justification as there are many aspecAntinatalism isn’t a dangerous idea – if anything it discourages people creating new beings that are going to be exposed to dangerous things! After all, someone can only suffer the evils in this world if they’re brought into existence. Likewise, only those who exist can perpetuate many of those same evils – which, unfortunately, many do. Natalism normalises and encourages creating new beings into such a world.

That said, any philosophy rooted in compassion can be misused. History has shown us that both well-intentioned and bad-faith actors can cause great harm whilst claiming to act in the name of a benevolent philosophy. Antinatalism is no exception. It can be distorted and used as a pretext for harmful behaviour, but such actions say more about the individual committing them than the philosophy itself.

#26 – What about all the art and beauty humans have created? That will be lost!

Humans have created many things that inspire awe: literature, art, communities, cultures, traditions and more. But these things have value only because we are here to value them – they have value to someone. We enjoy their sounds, tastes, textures, and sights – and we should embrace these experiences while we are here. But if humanity were to stop procreating and gradually cease to exist, the absence of these things wouldn’t be bad. There would be no one left for whom that absence would be a deprivation.

To put it differently: none of us existed a thousand years ago and our nonexistence didn’t harm or deprive us in any way. We might now feel a longing to have witnessed that past time, but such feelings only arise because we exist today and have come to learn about them. Without existence, there is no subject to experience loss or longing.

At the same time as appreciating our achievements, we need to acknowledge the immense harm humans have caused – both to each other and to other animals. Every gas chamber, every bomb, every bullet, every slaughterhouse, every slave ship… these horrors existed because of humans. It seems more important to ensure that these atrocities never exist than for us to ensure that beauty and art do.

#27 – You’re just jealous of people who can find someone to have kids with!

If you’re brave enough, try responding with, “Really? I thought we were hitting it off!” It might just save the conversation!

All jokes aside, this objection is just a personal attack. It’s an attempt to ridicule or delegitimise the antinatalist rather than engage with their actual argument. Like anyone else, antinatalists vary – some are happily in relationships, others are not, and some simply prefer not to have a partner. Romantic success has no bearing on the validity of the antinatalist position.

The best way to move on could be humour. A playful, “You offering?” or something like the earlier joke. Have a bit of a laugh and then more on to more productive ground.

#28 – Don’t you think babies are cute? They’re adorable!

Babies can be very cute. But just because someone in their infant years is cute and makes us laugh and feel warm inside, doesn’t mean we can objectify them and treat them as an accessory. Creating a new person is a very serious thing to do. The cuteness of a baby should not distract us from having a serious and genuine ethical discussion about procreation.

It’s also worth noting that just because someone morally opposes procreation doesn’t mean they cannot find babies to be cute or enjoy the company of children. These two things aren’t incompatible.

#29 – You just hate kids.

Being opposed to procreation doesn’t mean you hate children. Some antinatalists might dislike children but this is independent of antinatalist. In fact, a hatred of children would kind of sit at odds with antinatalism.

Children are the very individuals antinatalists are concerned about. They are the ones brought into a world of suffering through no choice of their own. If antinatalists hated children, wouldn’t it make more sense for them to be more indifferent to their suffering? In reality, antinatalists are deeply concerned about the harms children face.

In many cases, antinatalists may have spent more time thinking seriously about the fate of children than their prospective parents – who so often fail to consider the harms their children will suffer once having come into existence.

#30 – If you don’t have kids antinatalism will fade out when antinatalists die.

Besides the fact that it would be paradoxical to create new people to increase adherents of a view that creating new people is morally wrong, this objection rests on a faulty assumption. That is that moral beliefs can only be preserved or spread through procreation – or that alternative methods are insufficient to sustain them. This is simply not true.

First, antinatalism – and the idea that coming into existence is bad – has existed for thousands of years. Its survival is not due to adherents passing the idea on to their biological offspring. In fact, very few (if any) antinatalists today hold the view because their parents did. And even if that were a relevant factor, antinatalists could still adopt.

Second, moral beliefs are introduced and formed in many ways: education, dialogue, literature and activism, just to name a few. Now that the internet makes the exchange of ideas much easier, it’s far from clear that raising a child is an especially effective way to promote any specific moral belief.

Finally, even if procreation could somehow increase the number of antinatalists – itself paradoxical – this wouldn’t justify creating a child. Antinatalists view this act as deeply immoral. Asking antinatalists to procreate for their cause would be like asking pacifists to engage in conquest to spread values of peace.

#31 – You don’t need consent to create someone, there is no one to get it from!

This objection implicitly argues that it’s okay to do something to someone that will have direct, foreseen and significant consequences for them (including negative ones) without getting their consent first. Worse still, if one cannot gain consent, the moral requirement for it simply disappears.

This is a strange objection given how seriously we take consent in moral decision-making in other aspects of life. Sex without consent is rape; work without consent is slavery. If you cannot get consent from someone, this doesn’t give you moral license to act as you please. Imagine someone passed out at a party – would it be acceptable to perform sexual acts on them simply because they are unable to give consent? No, and doing so should be condemned.

There are exceptional circumstances where consent might be waived, but these are generally for actions that would prevent a greater harm befalling the person (and, usually, only when they cannot make the decision for themselves). Procreation isn’t one of these cases though – there isn’t anyone to be at risk of greater harm.

#32 – You’re playing god by not having children, deciding if someone gets to live.

‘Playing god’ usually refers to someone exercising power, control or influence over the lives and dealings of others in a way that they shouldn’t be. When it comes to this accusation being levelled at antinatalists, there are two key things to say in response.

First, the objection seems to imply that ‘playing god’ is inappropriate. Of course, there are times when it’s inappropriate to intervene in the affairs of others but there are also times when it can be appropriate. Like, for example, someone coming across and helping an incapacitated person in the street. This could be called ‘playing god’ as we are intervening in matters that do not concern us. But this isn’t an inappropriate intervention into the lives of others, it’s a good one. For us to judge whether ‘playing god’ is in fact positive or negative in any given case we would need to assess the particulars of that case. We cannot just dismiss things as ‘playing god’.

Second, it’s procreation that’s ‘playing god’ inappropriately. Not creating someone is of course choosing not to create that person, but this can’t be said to be ‘playing god’ in a negative sense as that person doesn’t exist to have been harmed by their not coming into existence. Procreation, on the other hand, decides on behalf of someone else that they must exist and experience hardship and be vulnerable to extreme suffering. That is playing god.

#33 – You’ll never stop everyone procreating.

Of course antinatalists aren’t likely to convince every last person not to reproduce; but this doesn’t mean that those who are confronted with antinatalist arguments can just dismiss them – arguments should be examined on their merits, not their popularity. Nor does it give them permission to contribute to the problem by procreating themselves.

Many moral issues are not all-or-nothing cases, and procreation is one – just because it cannot be fully stopped doesn’t mean that at least some instances of it can be avoided. Imagine if someone maintained that we shouldn’t attempt to alleviate starvation because we’ll never stop all starvation, it would be seen as ludicrous. The fact of the matter is that we can alleviate some starvation (like we can avoid some procreation) and that is good, and we should not make the perfect the enemy of the good.

#34 – Not everyone can adopt – it’s expensive!

This objection rests on a false dichotomy. It implies that because “adoption is expensive”, the proponent is justified in creating a child themselves; but there’s a third option: they could simply not create and raise a child.

Even if someone does desire to raise a child though, this desire doesn’t trump everything else. There needs to be a good moral justification for procreating, and if there isn’t one (and they won’t consider adoption) then they’ll simply have to refrain from procreation and their desire go unfulfilled. Sometimes doing what morality requires of us will mean forgoing things we want. Satisfying our desires isn’t always the most important thing. Our actions have consequences for others – both people that currently exist and those who will exist – and as such we must take them into account.

Let’s deal with the issue at hand though; whether adopting a child will be more expensive than creating one will depend on a range of things: the adoption system being used, the resources someone has at their disposal, their life situation, whether they’re raising the child with a partner or alone, amongst other factors. There are costs associated with adoption like, for example, fees; and there are non-financial costs like the screening someone has to go through. But there are also costs associated with creating a child like, for example, medical fees during pregnancy and birth and the health implications of going through said processes. Either way, whether adoption will be more costly than creating a child is not obvious.

#35 – Why do you have to preach to others? Focus on your own actions!

People advocate on all sorts of moral issues and it’s not surprising that they do. Viewing something as morally wrong is likely to motivate someone to want to prevent it happening, whether that be through influencing individuals and institutions or in some other way. In fact, citizens doing this is a sign of an open and liberal society.

Advocacy only really becomes an issue when another person doesn’t agree with the advocate’s values, but in that case this is just two people disagreeing. Not liking someone’s values doesn’t mean we should dismiss that person or their arguments without considering what they’re saying – we wouldn’t want someone to dismiss us when advocating something we care about.

Antinatalism is no different. Some people will want to advocate it, others will disagree. This disagreement should be approached as it would on any other moral issue; it shouldn’t be seen as a reason just to dismiss it.

If someone has given this objection though, they likely aren’t going to be open to having their mind changed. It’s better to avoid reaching this point in the first place and find ways to advocate antinatalism that comes across as approachable and engaging.

#36 – Even if humans go extinct, sentient life will arise somewhere else in the universe.

It’s possible that sentient life could arise elsewhere in the universe (perhaps it already has), but it isn’t clear whether human extinction would affect whether or not it does. Still, let’s consider the objection.

There are two potential interpretations: either the proponent of this objection is morally justified in creating a child because sentient life could arise elsewhere in the universe and 1) that makes avoiding creating life on Earth redundant, or 2) humans should continue our species so that we can alleviate the suffering of that sentient life.

Regarding the former, the presence of suffering in some other time or place doesn’t give someone moral license to cause a person to suffer here and now.

Regarding the latter, the idea that humans should continue to procreate in order to seek out extraterrestrial life and alleviate their suffering seems deeply fanciful. It requires imposing direct, serious harm on people (by creating them) in the hope that humanity will someday identify extraterrestrial life, coordinate an unprecedented global coalition to reach it and then effectively alleviate its suffering. This is an extraordinarily speculative justification for creating people. If the proponent thinks it to be a decent justification, they should ask themselves if they would be willing to impose equivalent harms on existing people for the same end. if the answer is ‘no’, then why impose it on people that will exist in the future (if they choose to create them)?

#37 – Life is supposed to have a good and bad side. You can’t appreciate the good without the bad!

This objection implicitly argues that it’s justifiable to impose the harms of life on someone because doing so is the only way they can experience the goods. There are at least two things to say in response.

First, whilst someone that exists is deprived by the absence of goods, someone who never comes into existence is not deprived by their absence – they don’t exist to be deprived. The absence of these goods is not a harm. Consequently, creating someone exposes them to the harms of life (which are bad) in exchange for goods they would never have missed.

Second, even if the goods are considered a reason to create someone, it’s still unclear that they are an adequate justification for imposing the harms. In any given case of procreation, we cannot predict with sufficient confidence the balance of good and bad in the resulting life. That balance is shaped by unpredictable variables like personal decisions, the decisions of others, natural processes, amongst other things. Even if we could make that prediction, we cannot know whether the future person would judge their coming into existence as worth the harm they endured. The only thing we can know for certain is that they’ll suffer to some extent, and that they’ll die.

This is why procreation has been likened to a game of Russian roulette with a fully loaded gun aimed at the head of one’s future child.

#38 – It’s up to each person to decide if their life is worth living, you can’t say it isn’t for others.

By using the ambiguous phrase, a life “worth living”, this objection fails to make the crucial distinction between starting a life and continuing one. Antinatalism pertains to the starting of lives, not the continuing of lives. Once someone exists, their life is their own; they should be the one to decide whether it’s worth continuing. The decision to start a life, however, is very different.

No one can decide for themselves to come into existence, we can only decide whether to continue to exist. This, again, exposes the confusion in this objection. If the proponent is opposed to someone making a decision on behalf of another, that is exactly what procreation is.

Perhaps then, the proponent might respond that what they mean is that everyone should be created so they can then decide whether they wish to continue to exist. But there are still problems with this. First, if someone never exists then they aren’t deprived of existence, so it isn’t bad if prospective parents decide not to reproduce. Second, once someone exists the only means of ending their existence is to kill themselves – this is a horrible circumstance to put someone in.

#39 – If we stop procreating, the sacrifice our ancestors made to get us to this point will have meant nothing.

This objection suggests that we owe it to our ancestors to continue reproducing. Whether by procreating themselves or generally contributing to society, our ancestors made sacrifices in their own lives so that we could exist – and we should honour that by continuing the species. There are a couple of things to say here.

First, our ancestors are dead (and most have been for a long time). They no longer exist and don’t care about what we do with our lives – including whether we procreate; much like they don’t exist or care about whether we have the internet or fly in planes. Any sense of obligation someone may feel toward their ancestors isn’t grounded in their interests – they no longer have any. And even if they somehow did have interests in our reproduction, it’s far from clear that they would override the ethical concerns over the serious harms imposed by procreation.

Second, this objection treats our ancestors’ actions as if they were a grand achievement. Whilst some of our ancestors may have done extraordinary things, and deserve recognition for doing so, procreation isn’t among them. Procreation has been (and continues to be) commonplace and done without much consideration of the potential harms to the future child.

Third, we mustn’t forget the horrors of history. Billions of people have been tortured, enslaved, and brutalised. A moral tribute to our ancestors isn’t the only framing reproduction can be given, it can also be seen as perpetuating the mistakes of the past and continuing unnecessary suffering.

Rather than appealing to a vague duty we have to our ancestors, we should evaluate the ethics of our actions based on their impact on the beings they will actually affect. The dead are gone. The living – and those who will come into existence – are the ones who bear the consequences.

#40 – Antinatalism is a trend, and it’ll end like all others.

This isn’t so much an objection to antinatalism as it is a dismissal of it. Still, it’s worth addressing.

Some may perceive the recent rise in interest as evidence that antinatalism is just a passing trend. But this is a mistake. Opposition to procreation has existed for thousands of years. One early example is Abū al-ʿAlāʾ al-Maʿarrī, a poet and philosopher who lived from 973 to 1057 AD. His work contains strong antinatalist themes, including direct condemnations of procreation. His self-written epitaph reads:

“This is my father's crime against me, which I myself committed against none.”

Antinatalism has survived for centuries without the benefit of modern communication tools. Now that we have the internet, the spread of these ideas has simply become more visible and accessible.

#41 – But I want to have my children join me in heaven!

It’s understandable that people who believe in an afterlife would want to spend it with their loved ones. But to make that possible, they would have to first create those loved ones – thereby exposing them to the risk of cancer, rape, infectious disease, murder, torture, dementia, brain damage, natural disaster, accidents, and any other horrors. And on top of that, their child could end up in hell. There’s no guarantee their child would reach heaven, they could live in such a way that condemns them to hell.

Is a personal desire to spend an afterlife in heaven with one’s loved ones important enough to justify these risks to them? Especially when the proponent could adopt and (hopefully) spend the afterlife in heaven with that child.

More fundamentally though, it’s worth the proponent reflecting on whether their belief in an afterlife is grounded in evidence and reason. When making decisions that have these sorts of consequences for others, we need to be sure that our relevant beliefs are well-founded. If the proponent’s belief is mistaken, the costs to their child – both certain and potential – are significant.

#42 – If we don’t procreate then those other groups will, and they’ll take over!

This objection isn’t rooted in natalism but in prejudice against a particular religious, ethnic, socio-economic, or some other group. According to this view, procreation is a means of “winning out” over that group – by increasing the number of one’s own group.

The response to this objection will, in part, be determined by the type of group in question. Some group identities are involuntary (e.g. one’s ethnic group) and the only way to increase membership is to procreate. In these cases, responding to the objection might best be done by addressing the prejudice directly – in the hope that this could disarm the proponent’s want to ‘outbreed’ the competing group.

Other group identities are voluntary (e.g. one’s political affiliation), and in cases like these there are some additional things that can be said to convince the proponent not to procreate:

Procreation isn’t the only way to grow a group, nor is it the most effective. Creating a child is very resource-intensive. Using the resources and time that would have been used to raise a child could be more cost-effectively used in encouraging existing people to join.
There’s no guarantee a child will align with their parent’s ideals and identify with the same groups.
Whilst children shouldn’t be seen as ideological tools, if raising one could result in their joining the same groups as their parents (and the proponent will not change their mind about using children as a means to their ends), then adoption seems a better option. It avoids imposing harm on a new being whilst having the benefit of providing an already existing child with a loving home and family, and potentially decreasing the chances they would join the other group.

Whichever form this objection comes in though, one thing that should be pushed back on is the willingness to use people simply as a means to our political, religious or other ends.

#43 – Antinatalism is anti-woman. How dare you tell a woman what to do with her body!

Interpreting antinatalism as telling women what to do with their bodies is a misreading of the arguments. Antinatalism is a position against creating new sentient beings, including through procreation – a process that involves both men and women. It’s not about controlling women’s bodies; it’s about challenging anyone considering procreating to offer a moral justification for doing so.

Of course, bodily autonomy is important. What a woman – or anyone – does with their body is, to an extent, a personal choice. But procreation involves a non-consenting third party: the future child. This is what makes it more than just a personal choice. Whilst people should be legally permitted to make their own reproductive decisions, there still needs to be a basic level of moral responsibility for one’s actions.

It’s also worth noting that while antinatalism isn’t inherently a gendered issue, women often stand to benefit more from non-procreation. Pregnancy and childbirth come with certain health risks – some of which can be permanent – and the burden of raising children still disproportionately falls on women in most contexts. Choosing not to procreate avoids these things. It would also avoid bringing more women and girls into a world where they still face discrimination and disadvantage. The only way to guarantee a woman will not experience these harms is to not create her in the first place. In this way, antinatalism could help in reducing discrimination against women and girls.

#44 – Antinatalism is a religion and a cult!

This objection seeks to discredit antinatalism by labelling it something which many people would feel justified in not taking seriously. The proponent is likely doing this as a way to shut down conversation and avoid having their worldview challenged.

Antinatalism isn’t a religion or a cult. It is a philosophical position: the view that creating new sentient beings is morally wrong. Could a community that shares this view exhibit cult-like behaviour? In theory, yes – but that could be said of any community. To make such a claim meaningfully, the person raising the objection would need to point to specific dynamics and offer evidence. Otherwise, the accusation amounts to mere deflection.

Even if some individuals within an antinatalist community do display cult-like tendencies, this is an issue with those individuals – not with the philosophy itself. And if the proponent is confusing the two. This is likely a dead end to the conversation and it’d be better to steer the conversation back onto the philosophy.

#45 – If I don’t have children how will I leave a legacy?

The desire to leave a legacy is understandable. Creating a person in order to do so though, isn’t. It’s a fundamentally self-centred thing to do, which is ironic given that few people would want to be remembered that way.

When a parent creates a child to serve as part of their legacy, they not only expose that child to the harms of existence, but also place an emotional burden on them to live in such a way that the parent would approve of. What’s more, these expectations might conflict with how the child wishes to live their life.

If someone genuinely wants to raise a child as part of their legacy (though children shouldn’t be reduced to a legacy project), they could adopt. Providing care and love to someone who already exists and needs support is actually something worth being remembered for!

Procreation isn’t even an effective way to leave a legacy as well. The vast majority of people throughout history have had children and they have mostly been forgotten. Even if your child goes on to accomplish great things, it’s them who will be remembered – not their parents. And when a parent is remembered, it’s almost always because they did something of significance independent of creating a child.

If it’s a legacy that someone wants, then creating positive change in the world is probably the best way to go.

#46 – Your thinking is too black and white; you can’t say procreation is always bad.

Antinatalists can be steadfast in their views and it isn’t clear why this would be bad. People are steadfast in opposing a range of serious things: child abduction, rape and genocide, to name a few. Should those views be dismissed as “black and white” thinking? No. So, why dismiss antinatalism in this way?

Of course, if an antinatalist refuses to consider opposing arguments or engage in good-faith discussion, that’s a problem. But that’s an issue with that antinatalist’s mindset, not with the philosophy itself.

Antinatalism is a rich and nuanced philosophy that doesn’t – and shouldn’t – encourage “black-and-white” thinking. It encompasses a wide range of perspectives, with antinatalists often disagreeing on key questions like: is extinction a goal or a consequence? Should antinatalism include other animals? Could procreation be permissible in the context of a phased extinction? The presence of these unsettled questions hardly suggests antinatalism to be a product of “black-and-white” thinking.

#47 – Life isn’t an imposition, it’s an opportunity.

Presumably, the “opportunity” that life offers is the chance to experience positive things like awe, beauty, meaning and pleasure. But framing this as an opportunity is misguided. While someone who already exists would benefit from having these positive experiences, if they’d never come into existence there wouldn’t be anyone to need or desire them. Opportunity seems the wrong word to describe the fulfilling of desires that only exist because a person was created in the first place.

There are several reasons why an antinatalist might quite reasonably frame life as an imposition though. First, it’s generally much easier for bad things to happen to us than for good things to be secured. Illness, injury and loneliness, for example, often occur without any effort made to bring induce them. Whereas health, safety and relationships usually require sustained effort to achieve and maintain. Second, life is marked by a constant stream of needs and desires – many of which, if unmet, result in suffering. And each of us must continuously work, often doing things we’d rather not, to fulfil them – if we can at all. Only then for those desires to be replaced by new ones. This predicament we find ourselves in isn’t a result of our choosing, but something others signed us up to by creating us. This is why it’s reasonable to characterise life as an imposition.

This isn’t to deny that life can contain good things. It’s simply to note that we didn’t need any of these things before we were created, and that their presence only constitutes a benefit in comparison to us existing without them – not in comparison to never coming into existence at all.

#48 – Suffering isn’t always bad, many people grow through suffering!

It’s true that suffering can lead to personal growth – but that fact alone doesn’t justify imposing suffering on others, nor does it negate the intrinsic badness of suffering itself.

Individuals might choose to suffer in the pursuit of growth, or they may find ways to grow from suffering they didn’t choose. In fact, once someone exists, it’s probably preferable to build a bit of resilience through experiencing some level of suffering. But this isn’t because suffering can be positive, it’s because it can be a means of preventing further suffering. And it’s very different from deliberately imposing suffering on others.

If someone grows as a result of being abused, that doesn’t make the abuse morally acceptable, nor does it justify others committing similar acts. The same logic applies to procreation: bringing someone into existence imposes significant harm on them, and invoking the possibility of personal growth doesn’t cut it as a justification.

Moreover, the idea of growth through suffering is largely irrelevant in the context of procreation. Growth is only valuable if someone already exists to benefit from it. Before a person exists, there isn’t anyone in need of the instrumental value that some forms of suffering might bring.

Finally, much of the suffering in the world carries little meaningful opportunity for growth. Terminal illness often brings intense, drawn-out pain, for example. This kind of gratuitous suffering is commonplace and carries little-to-no instrumental benefit. There are also many individuals – cognitively impaired or otherwise – that don’t have the tools to turn suffering into growth. Their pain remains exactly what it is: pain.

#49 – Life contains risk! We can’t live in a safety bubble for fear of what might happen.

This objection paints antinatalists as being overly cautious in their actions. And if everyone were to have the risk tolerance that antinatalists do it’d condemn us all to never leaving our homes for fear that something bad might happen. But this is a misrepresentation of what antinatalists are saying.

First, there’s a crucial difference between taking risks in our own life and taking risks on someone else’s behalf. Antinatalism is concerned with the latter. Once someone exists, they can choose to take risks for themselves that they think will pay off – often this actually makes our lives go better. But that is very different from imposing risks on someone else by creating them. Morally, we (rightly) tend to be far more cautious when making choices that’ll significantly impact others, particularly when they have no say in the matter. That is the case with procreation.

Second, the risks imposed by procreation are serious. Creating someone leaves them vulnerable to all the bad things that could befall someone: disease, torture, chronic illness, sexual violence, abuse, grief, war, poverty, cancer, bullying… the list goes on. And they’re just generally at risk of living a life that could go extraordinarily bad – a life no one would wan to live. It’s reasonable to want to avoid imposing such risks on other people.

Finally, there are some situations where taking a risk on someone else’s behalf could be justified but these tend to be in circumstances where the potential harm is minimal or where it helps avoid a greater harm to the person. Procreation isn’t one of these cases though. Before someone exists they aren’t vulnerable to any harm that would warrant a risk being taken for them.

If procreation weren’t so normal – and people didn’t have a vested interest in viewing it positively – the risks it carries would be taken more seriously.

#50 – You don’t know if creating someone does more harm than good overall! We should be agnostic.

Agnosticism about whether creating someone is morally permissible is often defended on the grounds of uncertainty about the overall consequences of doing so. One form this objection takes is the claim that we can’t know whether procreation or non-procreation would result in a future with less suffering.

Agnosticism about uncertain future outcomes doesn’t mean someone has to be agnostic about whether to impose clear and significant harms – especially when those harms are being imposed on a non-consenting individual. In the case of procreation, the harms that might befall the person are serious: chronic illness, sexual violence, disease, bereavement, loneliness, ageing, physical violence, and more. And the risks of these harms are in addition to the guaranteed suffering that that person will experience. When direct harms such as these are clear (even if the broader consequences are uncertain), it seems reasonable to err on the side of caution and not impose them.

We must also acknowledge how bad life can get. Some lives involve extraordinary suffering – and when it comes to non-human animals, their lives quite often contain horrific levels of violence. When we create someone, we risk creating a life of this kind. To remain agnostic about whether we should take that risk – especially when it’s sometimes not an insignificant one – seems particularly callous.

#51 – It’s not just about the child! Creating people benefits others and improves society.

Creating a child can have benefit for others – whether that be a specific individual or society more broadly. Take the parents as an example; they may find meaning and fulfilment in creating a child, or they might receive financial benefits from the state.

The real question though, is whether it’s acceptable to impose serious harm on a child in order to benefit ourselves or others? A child we would claim to love, no less. Antinatalists can’t compel prospective parents to answer this question as they would, but considering the types of harms that might (and likely will) befall their future child might lead them to reconsider their answer. These harms include disease, aging, accidents, violence, natural disasters, bereavement, mental illness, loneliness, and more. Perhaps the callousness of appealing to the benefits to others of creating a child will become clearer when we ask parents the question: which specific benefits to ourselves or to others would justify imposing these harms – or the risks of these harms – on a potential child?

It’s when we get down to specifics like these that it should become apparent how obscene it is to suggest imposing such harms on another for personal benefit.

#52 – People are tougher than you think, they can withstand the suffering in life.

There are a couple things to say in response to this objection.

First, a person having the fortitude to withstand the hardships in life is only a benefit if they face said hardships. If they never came into existence then there would be no hardships to overcome. And to use someone’s ability to overcome hardship as a reason to create them and thus impose hardship on them is morally confused. What’s more, dismissing the hardships you’re is imposing on others by saying “they can take it” is more than just confused, it’s a callous and an immoral way of avoiding responsibility.

Second, even if you see the creation of those who can overcome hardship as good, they come at the cost of those who won’t be able to overcome it. When someone procreates they can’t be sufficiently confident what kind of person they’ll create. They could create someone who doesn’t have the capacity to overcome the hardships they’ll face. And why should they need to be in this position in the first place, when the alternative of never existing is completely unproblematic?

#53 – Why should I have to sacrifice having a child just to prevent suffering for someone else? It’s a big ask!

It’s understandable why someone might view forgoing creating a child as a sacrifice. Procreation is often an important part of peoples’ life plan and to be confronted by a view that questions the morality of it could be distressing. And if someone accepts antinatalism, their future plans could be significantly upended.

Having said that, to act in accordance with what morality requires of us we sometimes must forgo things that we want – it seems inappropriate to frame that as a sacrifice. Consider this example: morality requires us not to steal the property of others. If someone regularly steals items from other people, bringing their actions in-line with what morality requires of them (i.e. not stealing) would be an inappropriate thing to label a sacrifice. Luckily, in the context of procreation though, no ‘sacrifice’ is needed because prospective parents can adopt or foster a child.

Finally, this objection confuses preventing suffering with causing it. Not creating someone isn’t an act of preventing suffering that would otherwise have occurred, it’s simply not imposing suffering.

#54 – You’re just weak! You can’t handle life and are trying to stop stronger people from thriving.

This response is an ad hominem attack, but it can be addressed.

‘Weak’ is probably not being used to mean physical strength here but rather mental fortitude. There’s no reason to think that antinatalists are particularly weak in this respect, though. Some antinatalists will lack mental fortitude but so will many people generally. Antinatalists exist on a spectrum of resilience just like everyone else.

And there’s no reason to think that antinatalists are trying to stop people from thriving. Someone might view creating a child as part of how they will thrive as a person and it’s unfortunate that this conflicts with what morality requires of us. Of course, antinatalists would support any such person in pursuing other ways of thriving – like adopting a child, for example.

#55 – Why don’t you focus on poor people? They have loads of kids!

Antinatalism is the view that creating any sentient being is morally wrong, it doesn’t only apply to specific religious, economic or ethnic groups. People in both higher- and lower-income countries should be exposed to the antinatalist view.

Now, before the proponent of this objection points the finger it would be wise for them to make sure they’re not under a misapprehension. When referring to “the poor” they might be thinking of middle-income countries with large populations like India, Bangladesh or China. However, these countries have birth rates at, around or below the replacement rate of 2.1 births per woman [1]; in fact, the fertility rate of some countries traditionally seen as poorer are lower than those of higher-income countries. To give an example, as of 2023, China’s average fertility rate is lower than that of the UK and the USA.

That being said, there are some countries where the average fertility rate is still significantly higher than the global average; and these countries do tend to be lower-income. This shouldn’t be seen as a reason to demonise these populations though. The fertility rates in these countries are usually a result of higher infant mortality, a lack of access to effective contraception and other such factors. By recognising the causes of their higher fertility we can support policies and/or campaigns that both help the people and reduce birth rates simultaneously.

Table of Contents

#1 – Animals procreate, why can’t we? It’s natural!